Ticket #27250: openssh-5.9p1-gsskex-all-20110920.patch

new file ChangeLog.gssapi

@@ +1 @@
+20110101
+  - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
+  - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
+ 
+20100308
+  - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
+    Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
+  - [ servconf.c ]
+    Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
+    some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin 
+    Watson.
+  -
+
+20100124
+  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
+    Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
+    Colin Watson
+
+20090615
+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
+      sshd.c ]
+    Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
+        Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
+        Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
+        Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
+        Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
+        Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
+        Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
+        Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
+        Cast data.length before printing
+        If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
+
+20090201
+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
+      ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
+    Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
+    to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
+
+20080404
+  - [ gss-serv.c ]
+    Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
+    been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
+    Stoichkov
+
+20070317
+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
+    Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a 
+    function
+
+20061220
+  - [ servconf.c ]
+    Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and 
+    documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
+
+20060910
+  - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
+      ssh-gss.h ]
+    add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
+  - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
+    Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
+    acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
+    <Bugzilla #928>
+  - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
+    Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
+    configuration files
+  - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
+    Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
+    Limit length of error messages displayed by client
+
+20060909
+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
+    move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
+    only, where they belong 
+    <Bugzilla #1225>
+
+20060829
+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
+    Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment 
+    variable
+
+20060828
+  - [ gss-genr.c ]
+    Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
+    <Fixed upstream 20060829>
+
+20060818
+  - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
+    Make sure that SPENGO is disabled 
+    <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
+
+20060421
+  - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
+    a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
+    fix compiler errors/warnings 
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+  - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
+    fix uninitialized variable warnings
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+  - [ gssgenr.c ]
+    pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+    <Bugzilla #1220 >
+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
+    #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+    <Fixed upstream 20060304>
+  - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c 
+    add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
+    add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+    <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>

Makefile.in

@@ -74 +74 @@
         atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
         monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
         kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
+        kexgssc.o \
         msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o \
         schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o
 
@@ -90 +91 @@
         auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
         monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
         auth-krb5.o \
-        auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+        auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
         loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
         sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
         roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o

auth-krb5.c

@@ -170 +170 @@
 
         len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
         authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+        snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
+            authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#else
         snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
             authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#endif
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
         if (options.use_pam)
@@ -226 +231 @@
 #ifndef HEIMDAL
 krb5_error_code
 ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
-        int tmpfd, ret;
+        int ret;
         char ccname[40];
         mode_t old_umask;
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+        char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
+#else
+        char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
+        int tmpfd;
+#endif
 
         ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
-            "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+            cctemplate, geteuid());
         if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
                 return ENOMEM;
 
+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
         old_umask = umask(0177);
         tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
         umask(old_umask);
@@ -249 +261 @@
                 return errno;
         }
         close(tmpfd);
+#endif
 
         return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
 }

auth2-gss.c

@@ -1 +1 @@
 /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -52 +52 @@
 static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
 static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
+/* 
+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
+ */
+static int
+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+        int authenticated = 0;
+        Buffer b;
+        gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+        u_int len;
+
+        mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+        mic.length = len;
+
+        packet_check_eom();
+
+        ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+            "gssapi-keyex");
+
+        gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+        gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+        /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
+        if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, 
+            &gssbuf, &mic))))
+                authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+                    authctxt->pw));
+        
+        buffer_free(&b);
+        xfree(mic.value);
+
+        return (authenticated);
+}
+
 /*
  * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
  * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
@@ -242 +278 @@
 
         packet_check_eom();
 
-        authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+        authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+            authctxt->pw));
 
         authctxt->postponed = 0;
         dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
@@ -277 +314 @@
         gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
 
         if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
-                authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+                authenticated = 
+                    PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
         else
                 logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
 
@@ -292 +330 @@
         userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
 }
 
+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
+        "gssapi-keyex",
+        userauth_gsskeyex,
+        &options.gss_authentication
+};
+
 Authmethod method_gssapi = {
         "gssapi-with-mic",
         userauth_gssapi,

auth2.c

@@ -69 +69 @@
 extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
 extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
 #ifdef GSSAPI
+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
 extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
 #endif
 #ifdef JPAKE
@@ -79 +80 @@
         &method_none,
         &method_pubkey,
 #ifdef GSSAPI
+        &method_gsskeyex,
         &method_gssapi,
 #endif
 #ifdef JPAKE

clientloop.c

@@ -111 +111 @@
 #include "msg.h"
 #include "roaming.h"
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
 /* import options */
 extern Options options;
 
@@ -1483 +1487 @@
                 /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
                 if (!rekeying) {
                         channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+                        if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
+                            ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
+                                debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
+                                need_rekeying = 1;
+                        }
+#endif
+
                         if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
                                 debug("need rekeying");
                                 xxx_kex->done = 0;

configure.ac

@@ -515 +515 @@
             [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
         AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
             [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+        AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
+        AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
+                [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
+                [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
+                 AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, 
+                        [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
+                 LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
+                 AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+                [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
+                 AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
+        AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
+        AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+                [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
+                [cc_context_t c;
+                 (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
+                [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, 
+                        [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
+                 LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
+                 AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+                 if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
+                        AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
+                fi],
+                [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
+        )
         m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
         AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], 
             AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])

gss-genr.c

@@ -1 +1 @@
 /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -39 +39 @@
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
 
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
 
 extern u_char *session_id2;
 extern u_int session_id2_len;
 
+typedef struct {
+        char *encoded;
+        gss_OID oid;
+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
+
+/*
+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
+ * XXX   passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
+ */
+
+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
+
+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
+
+int 
+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
+        return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
+ *
+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
+ */
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
+        gss_OID_set gss_supported;
+        OM_uint32 min_status;
+
+        if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
+                return NULL;
+
+        return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
+            host, client));
+}
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
+    const char *host, const char *client) {
+        Buffer buf;
+        size_t i;
+        int oidpos, enclen;
+        char *mechs, *encoded;
+        u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+        char deroid[2];
+        const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
+        EVP_MD_CTX md;
+
+        if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
+                for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
+                        xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
+                xfree(gss_enc2oid);
+        }
+
+        gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
+            (gss_supported->count + 1));
+
+        buffer_init(&buf);
+
+        oidpos = 0;
+        for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
+                if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
+                    (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
+
+                        deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
+                        deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
+
+                        EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+                        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
+                        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
+                            gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
+                            gss_supported->elements[i].length);
+                        EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+                        encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
+                        enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
+                            encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
+
+                        if (oidpos != 0)
+                                buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+
+                        buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
+                            sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+                        buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+                        buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+                        buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, 
+                            sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+                        buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+                        buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+                        buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
+                            sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+                        buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+
+                        gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
+                        gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
+                        oidpos++;
+                }
+        }
+        gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
+        gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
+
+        buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
+
+        mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
+        buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
+        buffer_free(&buf);
+
+        if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
+                xfree(mechs);
+                mechs = NULL;
+        }
+        
+        return (mechs);
+}
+
+gss_OID
+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
+        int i = 0;
+        
+        switch (kex_type) {
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+                if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
+                        return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+                name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
+                break;
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+                if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
+                        return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+                name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
+                break;
+        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+                if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
+                        return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+                name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
+                break;
+        default:
+                return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+        }
+
+        while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
+            strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
+                i++;
+
+        if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
+                ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
+
+        return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
+}
+
 /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
 int
 ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
@@ -197 +352 @@
         }
 
         ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
-            GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+            ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
             GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
             0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
 
@@ -227 +382 @@
 }
 
 OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
+{
+        gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+        gss_name_t gssname;
+        OM_uint32 status;
+        gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+        gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
+        gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
+
+        gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+        gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+
+        ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
+            GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
+
+        if (!ctx->major)
+                ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, 
+                    gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, 
+                    &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
+
+        gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
+        gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+
+        if (ctx->major)
+                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+        return(ctx->major);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
 {
+        if (ctx == NULL) 
+                return -1;
+
         if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
             GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
                 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
@@ -236 +425 @@
         return (ctx->major);
 }
 
+/* Priviledged when used by server */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+{
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+                return -1;
+
+        ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+            gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+
+        return (ctx->major);
+}
+
 void
 ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
     const char *context)
@@ -249 +451 @@
 }
 
 int
-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, 
+    const char *client)
 {
         gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
         OM_uint32 major, minor;
         gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
+        Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
+
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+                ctx = &intctx;
 
         /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
         if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
@@ -263 +470 @@
         ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
         ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
         major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
+
+        if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
+                major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
+
         if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
                 major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
                     NULL);
@@ -272 +483 @@
                             GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
         }
 
-        if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) 
                 ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
 
         return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
 }
 
+int
+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
+        static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+        static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
+        static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+        static gss_name_t name;
+        static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
+        OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
+        int equal;
+        gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE;
+        
+        now = time(NULL);
+
+        if (ctxt) {
+                debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
+
+                if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+                        gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
+
+                major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+                    &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
+
+                if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+                        saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
+                        saved_lifetime+= now;
+                } else {
+                        /* Handle the error */
+                }
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (now - last_call < 10)
+                return 0;
+
+        last_call = now;
+
+        if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+                return 0;
+        
+        major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, 
+            &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
+        if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
+                return 0;
+        else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+                return 0;
+
+        major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
+        gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+                return 0;
+
+        if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
+                return 1;
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* GSSAPI */

gss-serv-krb5.c

@@ -1 +1 @@
 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -120 +120 @@
         krb5_principal princ;
         OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
         int len;
+        const char *new_ccname;
 
         if (client->creds == NULL) {
                 debug("No credentials stored");
@@ -168 +169 @@
                 return;
         }
 
-        client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
+        new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
+
         client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
-        len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
-        client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
-        snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+        xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
+        client->store.filename = NULL;
+#else
+        xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
+        client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
+#endif
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
         if (options.use_pam)
@@ -184 +190 @@
         return;
 }
 
+int
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, 
+    ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+        krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+        krb5_principal principal = NULL;
+        char *name = NULL;
+        krb5_error_code problem;
+        OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+
+        if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
+                logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
+                    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+                return 0;
+        }
+        
+        /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
+        if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, 
+            &principal))) {
+                logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
+                    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
+                logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
+                    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+                krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+
+        if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
+                debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
+                krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+                krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+                return 0;
+        }
+        krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+
+        /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
+
+        if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
+                logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
+                    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+                krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+
+        if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
+            ccache))) {
+                logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
+                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        return 1;
+}
+
 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
         "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
         "Kerberos",
@@ -191 +262 @@
         NULL,
         &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
         NULL,
-        &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
+        &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
+        &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
 };
 
 #endif /* KRB5 */

gss-serv.c

@@ -1 +1 @@
 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.22 2008/05/08 12:02:23 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -45 +45 @@
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "session.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
 
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
 
 static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}};
+    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME,  NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
 
 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
-    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
 
 #ifdef KRB5
 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
@@ -81 +86 @@
         char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
         gss_OID_set oidset;
 
-        gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-        gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+        if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
+                gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+                gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
 
-        if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
-                gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-                return (-1);
-        }
+                if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+                        gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+                        return (-1);
+                }
+
+                if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+                        gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+                        return (ctx->major);
+                }
+
+                if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+                    ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, 
+                    NULL, NULL)))
+                        ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
 
-        if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
                 gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
                 return (ctx->major);
+        } else {
+                ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+                ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
         }
-
-        if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-            ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
-                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
-        gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-        return (ctx->major);
+        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 }
 
 /* Privileged */
@@ -114 +126 @@
 }
 
 /* Unprivileged */
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
+        gss_OID_set     supported;
+
+        ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
+        return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
+            NULL, NULL));
+}
+
+/* Unprivileged */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
+    const char *dummy) {
+        Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
+        int res;
+ 
+        res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
+        ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
+
+        return (res);
+}
+
+/* Unprivileged */
 void
 ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
 {
@@ -123 +158 @@
         gss_OID_set supported;
 
         gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
-        gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
+
+        if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
+                return;
 
         while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
                 if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
@@ -247 +284 @@
 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
 {
         int i = 0;
+        int equal = 0;
+        gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+        gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+        if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
+                if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
+                    (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
+                     ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
+                        debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
+                        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+                }
+
+                if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, 
+                    ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, 
+                    NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+                        ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+                        return (ctx->major);
+                }
+
+                ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, 
+                    new_name, &equal);
 
-        gss_buffer_desc ename;
+                if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
+                        ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+                        return (ctx->major);
+                }
+ 
+                if (!equal) {
+                        debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
+                        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+                }
+
+                debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
+
+                gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
+                gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
+                client->name = new_name;
+                client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+                ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+                client->updated = 1;
+                return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+        }
 
         client->mech = NULL;
 
@@ -263 +340 @@
         if (client->mech == NULL)
                 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
 
+        if (ctx->client_creds &&
+            (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
+             ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+                return (ctx->major);
+        }
+
         if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
             &client->displayname, NULL))) {
                 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
@@ -280 +364 @@
                 return (ctx->major);
         }
 
+        gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
+
         /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
         client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
         ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
@@ -327 +413 @@
 
 /* Privileged */
 int
-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
 {
         OM_uint32 lmin;
 
@@ -337 +423 @@
                 return 0;
         }
         if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
-                if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
+                if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
+                        gssapi_client.used = 1;
+                        gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
                         return 1;
-                else {
+                } else {
                         /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
                         gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
                         gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
@@ -352 +440 @@
         return (0);
 }
 
-/* Privileged */
-OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running 
+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
+ *
+ * In the child, we want to :
+ *    *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
+ *    *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
+ */
+
+/* Stuff for PAM */
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, 
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
 {
-        ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-            gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+        return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+#endif
 
-        return (ctx->major);
+void
+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
+        int ok;
+        int ret;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+        pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+        struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
+        char *envstr;
+#endif
+
+        if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && 
+            gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+            gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
+                return;
+ 
+        ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+
+        if (!ok)
+                return;
+
+        debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
+
+        /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
+         * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
+         * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
+         */
+#ifdef USE_PAM  
+        if (!use_privsep) {
+                debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
+                return;
+        }
+
+        ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
+            &pamconv, &pamh);
+        if (ret)
+                return;
+
+        xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, 
+            gssapi_client.store.envval);
+
+        ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
+        if (!ret)
+                pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
+        pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+}
+
+int 
+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
+        int ok = 0;
+
+        /* Check we've got credentials to store */
+        if (!gssapi_client.updated)
+                return 0;
+
+        gssapi_client.updated = 0;
+
+        temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
+        if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
+                ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
+        else
+                debug("No update function for this mechanism");
+
+        restore_uid();
+
+        return ok;
 }
 
 #endif

kex.c

@@ -50 +50 @@
 #include "monitor.h"
 #include "roaming.h"
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
 # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
 # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
@@ -358 +362 @@
                 k->kex_type = KEX_ECDH_SHA2;
                 k->evp_md = kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(k->name);
 #endif
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
+            sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
+                k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1;
+                k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+        } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
+            sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
+                k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1;
+                k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+        } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
+            sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
+                k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1;
+                k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
         } else
                 fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
 }

kex.h

@@ -73 +73 @@
         KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
         KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
         KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
+        KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
+        KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
+        KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
         KEX_MAX
 };
 
@@ -129 +132 @@
         sig_atomic_t done;
         int     flags;
         const EVP_MD *evp_md;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        int     gss_deleg_creds;
+        int     gss_trust_dns;
+        char    *gss_host;
+        char    *gss_client;
+#endif
         char    *client_version_string;
         char    *server_version_string;
         int     (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
@@ -156 +165 @@
 void     kexecdh_client(Kex *);
 void     kexecdh_server(Kex *);
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+void    kexgss_client(Kex *);
+void    kexgss_server(Kex *);
+#endif
+
 void
 kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);

new file kexgssc.c

@@ +1 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+void
+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
+        gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+        gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
+        Gssctxt *ctxt;
+        OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
+        u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
+        DH *dh; 
+        BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
+        BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+        BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+        BIGNUM *g = NULL;       
+        u_char *kbuf, *hash;
+        u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
+        u_char *empty = "";
+        char *msg;
+        char *lang;
+        int type = 0;
+        int first = 1;
+        int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+
+        /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */       
+        ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
+        if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) 
+            == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+                fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
+
+        if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
+                fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
+
+        if (kex->gss_client && 
+            ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
+                fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
+
+        switch (kex->kex_type) {
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+                dh = dh_new_group1();
+                break;
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+                dh = dh_new_group14();
+                break;
+        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+                debug("Doing group exchange\n");
+                nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
+                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
+                packet_put_int(min);
+                packet_put_int(nbits);
+                packet_put_int(max);
+
+                packet_send();
+
+                packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
+
+                if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                        fatal("BN_new() failed");
+                packet_get_bignum2(p);
+                if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                        fatal("BN_new() failed");
+                packet_get_bignum2(g);
+                packet_check_eom();
+
+                if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
+                        fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
+                            min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
+
+                dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
+                break;
+        default:
+                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+        }
+        
+        /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
+        dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+
+        /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
+        dh_server_pub = BN_new();
+        if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
+                fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
+
+        token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+                         
+        do {
+                debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
+                
+                maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
+                    kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
+                    &ret_flags);
+
+                if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+                        if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+                                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                                packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+                                    send_tok.length);
+                        }
+                        fatal("gss_init_context failed");
+                }
+
+                /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
+                if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
+                        xfree(recv_tok.value);
+
+                if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+                        /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
+                        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+                                fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
+
+                        /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
+                        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+                                fatal("Integrity check failed");
+                }
+
+                /* 
+                 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
+                 * received cannot have been a 'complete'. 
+                 */
+                if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+                        if (first) {
+                                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
+                                packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+                                    send_tok.length);
+                                packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+                                first = 0;
+                        } else {
+                                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                                packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+                                    send_tok.length);
+                        }
+                        packet_send();
+                        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+
+                        /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
+                        do {    
+                                type = packet_read();
+                                if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
+                                        debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
+                                        if (serverhostkey)
+                                                fatal("Server host key received more than once");
+                                        serverhostkey = 
+                                            packet_get_string(&slen);
+                                }
+                        } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
+
+                        switch (type) {
+                        case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+                                debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+                                if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) 
+                                        fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
+                                recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
+                                recv_tok.length = strlen; 
+                                break;
+                        case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
+                                debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
+                                packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
+                                msg_tok.value =  packet_get_string(&strlen);
+                                msg_tok.length = strlen; 
+
+                                /* Is there a token included? */
+                                if (packet_get_char()) {
+                                        recv_tok.value=
+                                            packet_get_string(&strlen);
+                                        recv_tok.length = strlen;
+                                        /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
+                                        if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+                                                packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
+                                        } else {
+                                                /* No token included */
+                                                if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+                                                        packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
+                                }
+                                break;
+                        case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
+                                debug("Received Error");
+                                maj_status = packet_get_int();
+                                min_status = packet_get_int();
+                                msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+                                lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+                                fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
+                        default:
+                                packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+                                type);
+                        }
+                        token_ptr = &recv_tok;
+                } else {
+                        /* No data, and not complete */
+                        if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+                                fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
+                }
+        } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+        /* 
+         * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the 
+         * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok 
+         */
+
+        if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
+                fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
+
+        /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
+        if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
+                packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
+
+        /* compute K=f^x mod p */
+        klen = DH_size(dh);
+        kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+        kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
+        if (kout < 0)
+                fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+
+        shared_secret = BN_new();
+        if (shared_secret == NULL)
+                fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
+
+        if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+                fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
+        memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+        xfree(kbuf);
+
+        switch (kex->kex_type) {
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+                kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, 
+                    kex->server_version_string,
+                    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+                    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+                    (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
+                    dh->pub_key,        /* e */
+                    dh_server_pub,      /* f */
+                    shared_secret,      /* K */
+                    &hash, &hashlen
+                );
+                break;
+        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+                kexgex_hash(
+                    kex->evp_md,
+                    kex->client_version_string,
+                    kex->server_version_string,
+                    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+                    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+                    (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
+                    min, nbits, max,
+                    dh->p, dh->g,
+                    dh->pub_key,
+                    dh_server_pub,
+                    shared_secret,
+                    &hash, &hashlen
+                );
+                break;
+        default:
+                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+        }
+
+        gssbuf.value = hash;
+        gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+        /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
+        if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
+                packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
+
+        xfree(msg_tok.value);
+
+        DH_free(dh);
+        if (serverhostkey)
+                xfree(serverhostkey);
+        BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
+
+        /* save session id */
+        if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+                kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+                kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+                memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+        }
+
+        if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
+                ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
+
+        if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+                gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+        else
+                ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+        kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+        BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+        kex_finish(kex);
+}
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */

new file kexgsss.c

@@ +1 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+void
+kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
+{
+        OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+        
+        /* 
+         * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
+         * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific 
+         * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently 
+         * activating this non-standard behaviour.
+         */
+
+        OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
+        gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
+        gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+        Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+        u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
+        u_char *kbuf, *hash;
+        DH *dh;
+        int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
+        BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+        BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+        int type = 0;
+        gss_OID oid;
+        char *mechs;
+
+        /* Initialise GSSAPI */
+
+        /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
+         * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
+         * into life
+         */
+        if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) 
+                if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
+                        xfree(mechs);
+
+        debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
+        oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
+        if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+           fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
+
+        debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
+
+        if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
+                fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
+
+        switch (kex->kex_type) {
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+                dh = dh_new_group1();
+                break;
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+                dh = dh_new_group14();
+                break;
+        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+                debug("Doing group exchange");
+                packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
+                min = packet_get_int();
+                nbits = packet_get_int();
+                max = packet_get_int();
+                min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+                max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+                packet_check_eom();
+                if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
+                        fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
+                            min, nbits, max);
+                dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
+                if (dh == NULL)
+                        packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
+
+                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
+                packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
+                packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
+                packet_send();
+
+                packet_write_wait();
+                break;
+        default:
+                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+        }
+
+        dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+
+        do {
+                debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
+                type = packet_read();
+                switch(type) {
+                case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
+                        if (dh_client_pub != NULL) 
+                                fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
+                        recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+                        recv_tok.length = slen; 
+
+                        if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                                fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
+
+                        packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
+
+                        /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
+                        break;
+                case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+                        recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+                        recv_tok.length = slen; 
+                        break;
+                default:
+                        packet_disconnect(
+                            "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+                            type);
+                }
+
+                maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, 
+                    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
+
+                xfree(recv_tok.value);
+
+                if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
+                        fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
+
+                if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
+                        fatal("No client public key");
+                
+                if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+                        debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+                        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                        packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+                        packet_send();
+                        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+                }
+        } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+        if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+                if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+                        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                        packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+                        packet_send();
+                }
+                fatal("accept_ctx died");
+        }
+
+        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+                fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
+
+        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+                fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
+        
+        if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
+                packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
+
+        klen = DH_size(dh);
+        kbuf = xmalloc(klen); 
+        kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
+        if (kout < 0)
+                fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+
+        shared_secret = BN_new();
+        if (shared_secret == NULL)
+                fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
+
+        if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+                fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
+        memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+        xfree(kbuf);
+
+        switch (kex->kex_type) {
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+                kex_dh_hash(
+                    kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
+                    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+                    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+                    NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
+                    dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
+                    &hash, &hashlen
+                );
+                break;
+        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+                kexgex_hash(
+                    kex->evp_md,
+                    kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
+                    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+                    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+                    NULL, 0,
+                    min, nbits, max,
+                    dh->p, dh->g,
+                    dh_client_pub,
+                    dh->pub_key,
+                    shared_secret,
+                    &hash, &hashlen
+                );
+                break;
+        default:
+                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+        }
+
+        BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+
+        if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+                kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+                kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+                memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+        }
+
+        gssbuf.value = hash;
+        gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+        if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
+                fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
+
+        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
+        packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+        packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
+
+        if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+                packet_put_char(1); /* true */
+                packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+        } else {
+                packet_put_char(0); /* false */
+        }
+        packet_send();
+
+        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
+
+        if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+                gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+        else 
+                ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+        DH_free(dh);
+
+        kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+        BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+        kex_finish(kex);
+
+        /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
+         * just exchanged.  */
+        if (options.gss_store_rekey)
+                ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */

key.c

@@ -971 +971 @@
                 }
                 break;
 #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+        case KEY_NULL:
+                return "null";
         }
         return "ssh-unknown";
 }
@@ -1276 +1278 @@
             strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) {
                 return KEY_ECDSA_CERT;
 #endif
+        } else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) {
+                return KEY_NULL;
         }
 
         debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);

key.h

@@ -44 +44 @@
         KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
         KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
         KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
+        KEY_NULL,
         KEY_UNSPEC
 };
 enum fp_type {

monitor.c

@@ -172 +172 @@
 int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -241 +243 @@
     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
 #endif
 #ifdef JPAKE
     {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
@@ -253 +256 @@
 };
 
 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
+#endif
     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
@@ -357 +366 @@
                 /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+                /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif
         } else {
                 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
 
@@ -443 +456 @@
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+                /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif          
         } else {
                 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
@@ -1692 +1709 @@
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        if (options.gss_keyex) {
+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+        }
+#endif
         kex->server = 1;
         kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
         kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
@@ -1898 +1922 @@
         OM_uint32 major;
         u_int len;
 
+        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
         goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
         goid.length = len;
 
@@ -1925 +1952 @@
         OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
         u_int len;
 
+        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
         in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
         in.length = len;
         major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
@@ -1942 +1972 @@
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
         }
         return (0);
 }
@@ -1953 +1984 @@
         OM_uint32 ret;
         u_int len;
 
+        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
         gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
         gssbuf.length = len;
         mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
@@ -1979 +2013 @@
 {
         int authenticated;
 
-        authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
+        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+        authenticated = authctxt->valid && 
+            ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
 
         buffer_clear(m);
         buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
@@ -1992 +2030 @@
         /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
         return (authenticated);
 }
+
+int 
+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+        gss_buffer_desc data;
+        gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+        OM_uint32 major, minor;
+        u_int len;
+
+        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+        data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+        data.length = len;
+        if (data.length != 20) 
+                fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, 
+                    (int) data.length);
+
+        /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
+        if (session_id2_len == 0) {
+                session_id2_len = data.length;
+                session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
+                memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
+        }
+        major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
+
+        xfree(data.value);
+
+        buffer_clear(m);
+        buffer_put_int(m, major);
+        buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
+
+        mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
+
+        gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
+
+        /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+        
+        /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
+
+        return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
+        ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+        int ok;
+
+        store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+        store.envvar   = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+        store.envval   = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+        ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
+
+        xfree(store.filename);
+        xfree(store.envvar);
+        xfree(store.envval);
+
+        buffer_clear(m);
+        buffer_put_int(m, ok);
+
+        mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
+
+        return(0);
+}
+
 #endif /* GSSAPI */
 
 #ifdef JPAKE

monitor.h

@@ -53 +53 @@
         MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP,
         MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
         MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
+        MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN,
+        MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS,
         MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
         MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
         MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,

monitor_wrap.c

@@ -1232 +1232 @@
 }
 
 int
-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
 {
         Buffer m;
         int authenticated = 0;
@@ -1249 +1249 @@
         debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
         return (authenticated);
 }
+
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
+{
+        Buffer m;
+        OM_uint32 major;
+        u_int len;
+
+        buffer_init(&m);
+        buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
+
+        mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
+        mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
+
+        major = buffer_get_int(&m);
+        hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+        hash->length = len;
+
+        buffer_free(&m);
+
+        return(major);
+}
+
+int
+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
+{
+        Buffer m;
+        int ok;
+
+        buffer_init(&m);
+
+        buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
+        buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
+        buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
+        
+        mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
+        mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
+
+        ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+        buffer_free(&m);
+        
+        return (ok);
+}
+
 #endif /* GSSAPI */
 
 #ifdef JPAKE

monitor_wrap.h

@@ -57 +57 @@
 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM

readconf.c

@@ -129 +129 @@
         oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
         oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
         oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+        oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
+        oGssServerIdentity, 
         oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
         oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
         oHashKnownHosts,
@@ -169 +171 @@
         { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
 #if defined(GSSAPI)
         { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+        { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
         { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+        { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+        { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
+        { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
+        { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
 #else
         { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+        { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
         { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
+        { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+        { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
+        { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
 #endif
         { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
         { "usersh", oDeprecated },
@@ -479 +490 @@
                 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
                 goto parse_flag;
 
+        case oGssKeyEx:
+                intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
+                goto parse_flag;
+
         case oGssDelegateCreds:
                 intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
                 goto parse_flag;
 
+        case oGssTrustDns:
+                intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
+                goto parse_flag;
+
+        case oGssClientIdentity:
+                charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
+                goto parse_string;
+
+        case oGssServerIdentity:
+                charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
+                goto parse_string;
+
+        case oGssRenewalRekey:
+                intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
+                goto parse_flag;
+
         case oBatchMode:
                 intptr = &options->batch_mode;
                 goto parse_flag;
@@ -1092 +1123 @@
         options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
         options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
         options->gss_authentication = -1;
+        options->gss_keyex = -1;
         options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
+        options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+        options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
+        options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
+        options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
         options->password_authentication = -1;
         options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
         options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
@@ -1193 +1229 @@
                 options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
         if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
                 options->gss_authentication = 0;
+        if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+                options->gss_keyex = 0;
         if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
                 options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+        if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
+                options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+        if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
+                options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
         if (options->password_authentication == -1)
                 options->password_authentication = 1;
         if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)

readconf.h

@@ -46 +46 @@
         int     challenge_response_authentication;
                                         /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
         int     gss_authentication;     /* Try GSS authentication */
+        int     gss_keyex;              /* Try GSS key exchange */
         int     gss_deleg_creds;        /* Delegate GSS credentials */
+        int     gss_trust_dns;          /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+        int     gss_renewal_rekey;      /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
+        char    *gss_client_identity;   /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
+        char    *gss_server_identity;   /* GSSAPI target principal */
         int     password_authentication;        /* Try password
                                                  * authentication. */
         int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */

servconf.c

@@ -97 +97 @@
         options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
         options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
         options->gss_authentication=-1;
+        options->gss_keyex = -1;
         options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+        options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+        options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
         options->password_authentication = -1;
         options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
         options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
@@ -226 +229 @@
                 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
         if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
                 options->gss_authentication = 0;
+        if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+                options->gss_keyex = 0;
         if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
                 options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+        if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
+                options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
+        if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
+                options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
         if (options->password_authentication == -1)
                 options->password_authentication = 1;
         if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -318 +327 @@
         sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
         sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
         sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
-        sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+        sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+        sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
+        sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
         sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
         sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
         sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
@@ -386 +397 @@
 #ifdef GSSAPI
         { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
         { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #else
         { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
         { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #endif
+        { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
         { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
         { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
         { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -944 +965 @@
                 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
                 goto parse_flag;
 
+        case sGssKeyEx:
+                intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
+                goto parse_flag;
+
         case sGssCleanupCreds:
                 intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
                 goto parse_flag;
 
+        case sGssStrictAcceptor:
+                intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
+                goto parse_flag;
+
+        case sGssStoreRekey:
+                intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
+                goto parse_flag;
+
         case sPasswordAuthentication:
                 intptr = &options->password_authentication;
                 goto parse_flag;
@@ -1704 +1737 @@
 #endif
 #ifdef GSSAPI
         dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
         dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
 #endif
 #ifdef JPAKE
         dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,

servconf.h

@@ -97 +97 @@
         int     kerberos_get_afs_token;         /* If true, try to get AFS token if
                                                  * authenticated with Kerberos. */
         int     gss_authentication;     /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+        int     gss_keyex;              /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
         int     gss_cleanup_creds;      /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+        int     gss_strict_acceptor;    /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+        int     gss_store_rekey;
         int     password_authentication;        /* If true, permit password
                                                  * authentication. */
         int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */

ssh-gss.h

@@ -1 +1 @@
 /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -60 +60 @@
 
 #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
 
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT                            30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE                        31
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE                        32
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY                         33
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR                           34
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ                        40
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP                           41
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID                            "gss-group1-sha1-"
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID                           "gss-group14-sha1-"
+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID                             "gss-gex-sha1-"
+
 typedef struct {
         char *filename;
         char *envvar;
         char *envval;
+        struct passwd *owner;
         void *data;
 } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
 
@@ -71 +83 @@
         gss_buffer_desc displayname;
         gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
         gss_cred_id_t creds;
+        gss_name_t name;
         struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
         ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+        int used;
+        int updated;
 } ssh_gssapi_client;
 
 typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
@@ -83 +98 @@
         int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
         int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
         void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+        int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
 } ssh_gssapi_mech;
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -93 +109 @@
         gss_OID         oid; /* client */
         gss_cred_id_t   creds; /* server */
         gss_name_t      client; /* server */
-        gss_cred_id_t   client_creds; /* server */
+        gss_cred_id_t   client_creds; /* both */
 } Gssctxt;
 
 extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
 
 int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
 void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
@@ -116 +133 @@
 void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
 void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
 
 /* In the server */
+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, 
+    const char *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
+    const char *);
+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, 
+    const char *);
 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
 void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
 void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
 void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
 
+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
+
+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
 #endif /* GSSAPI */
 
 #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */

ssh_config

@@ -26 +26 @@
 #   HostbasedAuthentication no
 #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
 #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+#   GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+#   GSSAPITrustDNS no
 #   BatchMode no
 #   CheckHostIP yes
 #   AddressFamily any

ssh_config.5

@@ -508 +508 @@
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when 
+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default 
+identity will be used.
+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when 
+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
+hostname.
 .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
 Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
 The default is
 .Dq no .
-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
+If set to 
+.Dq yes
+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed 
+credentials to a session on the server.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
+Set to 
+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
+the name of the host being connected to. If 
+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
 .It Cm HashKnownHosts
 Indicates that
 .Xr ssh 1

sshconnect2.c

@@ -159 +159 @@
 {
         Kex *kex;
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
+        char *gss_host = NULL;
+#endif
+
         xxx_host = host;
         xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        if (options.gss_keyex) {
+                /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this 
+                 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+                orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+                if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+                        gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
+                else
+                        gss_host = host;
+
+                gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
+                if (gss) {
+                        debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+                        xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+                            "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+                }
+        }
+#endif
+
         if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
                 logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
                 options.ciphers = NULL;
@@ -196 +221 @@
         if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
                 myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+         * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+        if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
+                orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+                xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], 
+                    "%s,null", orig);
+                xfree(gss);
+        }
+#endif
+
         if (options.rekey_limit)
                 packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit);
 
@@ -206 +242 @@
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
         kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        if (options.gss_keyex) {
+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+        }
+#endif
         kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
         kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
         kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        if (options.gss_keyex) {
+                kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
+                kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
+                kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
+                if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+                        kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
+                } else {
+                        kex->gss_host = gss_host;
+        }
+        }
+#endif
+
         xxx_kex = kex;
 
         dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
@@ -304 +360 @@
 void    input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
 void    input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void    input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int     userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
 #endif
 
 void    userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
@@ -319 +376 @@
 
 Authmethod authmethods[] = {
 #ifdef GSSAPI
+        {"gssapi-keyex",
+                userauth_gsskeyex,
+                NULL,
+                &options.gss_authentication,
+                NULL},
         {"gssapi-with-mic",
                 userauth_gssapi,
                 NULL,
@@ -625 +687 @@
         static u_int mech = 0;
         OM_uint32 min;
         int ok = 0;
+        const char *gss_host;
+
+        if (options.gss_server_identity)
+                gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
+        else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+                gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
+        else
+                gss_host = authctxt->host;
 
         /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
          * once. */
 
         if (gss_supported == NULL)
-                gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
+                if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
+                        gss_supported = NULL;
+                        return 0;
+                }
 
         /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
         while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
                 /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
                 if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
                     ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
-                    &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
+                    &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, 
+                    options.gss_client_identity)) {
                         ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
                 } else {
                         mech++;
@@ -734 +808 @@
 {
         Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
         Gssctxt *gssctxt;
-        int oidlen;
-        char *oidv;
+        u_int oidlen;
+        u_char *oidv;
 
         if (authctxt == NULL)
                 fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
@@ -845 +919 @@
         xfree(msg);
         xfree(lang);
 }
+
+int
+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+        Buffer b;
+        gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+        gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+        OM_uint32 ms;
+
+        static int attempt = 0;
+        if (attempt++ >= 1)
+                return (0);
+
+        if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
+                debug("No valid Key exchange context"); 
+                return (0);
+        }
+
+        ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
+            "gssapi-keyex");
+
+        gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+        gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+        if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
+                buffer_free(&b);
+                return (0);
+        }
+
+        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+        packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
+        packet_send();
+
+        buffer_free(&b);
+        gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
+
+        return (1);
+}
+
 #endif /* GSSAPI */
 
 int

sshd.c

@@ -120 +120 @@
 #include "roaming.h"
 #include "version.h"
 
+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
+#endif
+
 #ifdef LIBWRAP
 #include <tcpd.h>
 #include <syslog.h>
@@ -1590 +1594 @@
                 logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
                 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
         }
+#ifndef GSSAPI
+        /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
         if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
                 logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
                 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
         }
+#endif
         if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
                 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
                 exit(1);
@@ -1922 +1929 @@
         /* Log the connection. */
         verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
 
+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+        /*
+         * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
+         * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
+         * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode).  We do not
+         * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
+         * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
+         *
+         * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
+         * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
+         * new sessions for us.  Then all the users will end up in the
+         * same session (bad).
+         *
+         * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
+         * automatically.
+         *
+         * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
+         * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
+         */
+        {
+                OSStatus err = 0;
+                SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
+                SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
+
+                err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
+                if (err)
+                        error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
+                            (unsigned) err);
+                else
+                        debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
+                            (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
+
+                if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
+                        debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
+                            "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
+                else {
+                        debug("Creating new security session...");
+                        err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
+                        if (err)
+                                error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
+                                    (unsigned) err);
+
+                        err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, 
+                            &sattrs);
+                        if (err)
+                                error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
+                                    (unsigned) err);
+                        else
+                                debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
+                                    (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
+                }
+        }
+#endif
+
         /*
          * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
          * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm which is
@@ -2303 +2364 @@
 
         myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        {
+        char *orig;
+        char *gss = NULL;
+        char *newstr = NULL;
+        orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+        /* 
+         * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
+         * the other key exchange algorithms
+         */
+
+        if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+                orig = NULL;
+
+        if (options.gss_keyex)
+                gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+        else
+                gss = NULL;
+
+        if (gss && orig)
+                xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+        else if (gss)
+                newstr = gss;
+        else if (orig)
+                newstr = orig;
+
+        /* 
+         * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
+         * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
+         * host key algorithm we support
+         */
+        if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
+                myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
+
+        if (newstr)
+                myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
+        else
+                fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
+        }
+#endif
+
         /* start key exchange */
         kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
@@ -2310 +2413 @@
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        if (options.gss_keyex) {
+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+        }
+#endif
         kex->server = 1;
         kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
         kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;

sshd_config

@@ -72 +72 @@
 # GSSAPI options
 #GSSAPIAuthentication no
 #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
 
 # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, 
 # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will 

sshd_config.5

@@ -423 +423 @@
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
 Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
 on logout.
 The default is
 .Dq yes .
 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor 
+a client authenticates against. If
+.Dq yes
+then the client must authenticate against the
+.Pa host
+service on the current hostname. If 
+.Dq no
+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the 
+machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation 
+on multi homed machines. 
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
+and setting it to 
+.Dq no
+may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a 
+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed 
+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
+.Dq no .
 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
 Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
 with successful public key client host authentication is allowed